Cleinias:  Quite true.

Athenian:  And what is the definition of that which is named ‘soul’?  Can we conceive of any other than that which has been already given—­the motion which can move itself?

Cleinias:  You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?

Athenian:  Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change and motion in all things?

Cleinias:  Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.

Athenian:  And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower number which you may prefer?

Cleinias:  Exactly.

Athenian:  Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is the ruler?

Cleinias:  Nothing can be more true.

Athenian:  Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?

Cleinias:  Certainly.

Athenian:  Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to the body.

Cleinias:  To be sure.

Athenian:  In the next place, we must not of necessity admit that the soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things?

Cleinias:  We must.

Athenian:  And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move, however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?

Cleinias:  Of course.

Athenian:  One soul or more?  More than one—­I will answer for you; at any rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two—­one the author of good, and the other of evil.

Cleinias:  Very true.