Megillus:  There is no more proper champion of them.

Athenian:  Well, then, tell me, Cleinias—­for I must ask you to be my partner—­does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and earth and air to be the first elements of all things? these he calls nature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards; and this is not a mere conjecture of ours about his meaning, but is what he really means.

Cleinias:  Very true.

Athenian:  Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain opinion of all those physical investigators; and I would have you examine their arguments with the utmost care, for their impiety is a very serious matter; they not only make a bad and mistaken use of argument, but they lead away the minds of others:  that is my opinion of them.

Cleinias:  You are right; but I should like to know how this happens.

Athenian:  I fear that the argument may seem singular.

Cleinias:  Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such a discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation.  But if there be no other way of showing our agreement in the belief that there are Gods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take this way, my good sir.

Athenian:  Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of those who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions; they affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and destruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is last to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true nature of the Gods.

Cleinias:  Still I do not understand you.

Athenian:  Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the nature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin:  they do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all bodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions.  And if this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the things which are of the soul’s kindred be of necessity prior to those which appertain to the body?

Cleinias:  Certainly.

Athenian:  Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be prior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great and primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be the first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which however is a wrong term for men to apply to them; these will follow, and will be under the government of art and mind.

Cleinias:  But why is the word ‘nature’ wrong?

Athenian:  Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is the first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval element, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other things the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true if you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise.