next in order after deaths.  Let wounds be divided as homicides were divided—­into those which are involuntary, and which are given in passion or from fear, and those inflicted voluntarily and with premeditation.  Concerning all this, we must make some such proclamation as the following:  Mankind must have laws, and conform to them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast.  And the reason of this is that no man’s nature is able to know what is best for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what is best.  In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that the true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public good (for public good binds together states, but private only distracts them); and that both the public and private good as well of individuals as of states is greater when the state and not the individual is first considered.  In the second place, although a person knows in the abstract that this is true, yet if he be possessed of absolute and irresponsible power, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good as secondary.  Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and the whole city.  For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but rather the lord of all.  I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony with nature.  But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second best.  These look at things as they exist for the most part only, and are unable to survey the whole of them.  And therefore I have spoken as I have.

And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has hurt or wounded another.  Any one may easily imagine the questions which have to be asked in all such cases:  What did he wound, or whom, or how, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which greatly vary from one another.  And to allow courts of law to determine all these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible.  There is one particular which they must determine in all cases—­the question of fact.  And then, again, that the legislator should not permit them to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these cases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is next to impossible.

Cleinias:  Then what is to be the inference?

Athenian:  The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of law; others the legislator must decide for himself.