do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted,
the perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to
many laws—he shall be amenable to the extreme
punishments for assault, and impiety, and robbing
of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life;
and if a man could be slain more than once, most justly
would he who in a fit of passion has slain father
or mother, undergo many deaths. How can he, whom,
alone of all men, even in defence of his life, and
when about to suffer death at the hands of his parents,
no law will allow to kill his father or his mother
who are the authors of his being, and whom the legislator
will command to endure any extremity rather than do
this— how can he, I say, lawfully receive
any other punishment? Let death then be the appointed
punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his
father or his mother. But if brother kills brother
in a civil broil, or under other like circumstances,
if the other has begun, and he only defends himself,
let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had
slain an enemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen
kill a citizen, or a stranger a stranger. Or
if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a stranger
in self-defence, let him be free from guilt in like
manner; and so in the case of a slave who has killed
a slave; but if a slave have killed a freeman in self-defence,
let him be subject to the same law as he who has killed
a father; and let the law about the remission of penalties
in the case of parricide apply equally to every other
remission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord
remits the guilt of homicide to another, under the
idea that his act was involuntary, let the perpetrator
of the deed undergo a purification and remain in exile
for a year, according to law.
Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary
and committed in passion: we have now to speak
of voluntary crimes done with injustice of every kind
and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures,
and desires, and jealousies.
Cleinias: Very good.
Athenian: Let us first speak, as far as
we are able, of their various kinds. The greatest
cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the
soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly
found to exist where the passion reigns which is strongest
and most prevalent among the mass of mankind:
I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires
of never-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating
in natural disposition, and a miserable want of education.
Of this want of education, the false praise of wealth
which is bruited about both among Hellenes and barbarians
is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods
which in reality is only the third. And in this
way they wrong both posterity and themselves, for
nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth
about wealth should be spoken in all states—namely,
that riches are for the sake of the body, as the body
is for the sake of the soul. They are good, and