Athenian:  A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes.  Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into two sorts:  there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of wisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he knows all about matters of which he knows nothing.  This second kind of ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when attended with weakness, will only result in the errors of children and old men; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and most merciful of all laws.

Cleinias:  You are perfectly right.

Athenian:  We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is true.

Cleinias:  Certainly.

Athenian:  But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is superior and another inferior to ignorance.

Cleinias:  Very true.

Athenian:  We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment of their will; although an individual may be often drawn by them in opposite directions at the same time.

Cleinias:  Yes, often.

Athenian:  And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity, what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them:  When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires, tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not—­I call all this injustice.  But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the whole life of man, is to be called just; although the hurt done by mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice.  Leaving the question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having already delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling them somewhat more vividly to our memory:  One of them was of the painful sort, which we denominate anger and fear.

Cleinias:  Quite right.

Athenian:  There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a third of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best.  The latter being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions, and for these five we will make laws of two kinds.

Cleinias:  What are the two kinds?

Athenian:  There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.