Cleinias:  Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these objections?

Athenian:  That is a very fair question.  In the first place, let us—­

Cleinias:  Do what?

Athenian:  Let us remember what has been well said by us already, that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and contradictory.  Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty.  Have we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ from one another?  For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever, two kinds of actions have been distinguished—­the one, voluntary, the other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly.  But shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself?  How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation?  Impossible.  Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two, and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.

Cleinias:  I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain:  either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must show the meaning and truth of this statement.

Athenian:  Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable—­not to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and unholy.  But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction between them.

Cleinias:  Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us upon that point.

Athenian:  Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.

Cleinias:  Certainly.

Athenian:  I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds—­one, voluntary, and the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite as many and as great as the voluntary.  And please to consider whether I am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea that I am legislating for an involuntary injury.  But I should rather say that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and, on the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred, the author of the benefit may often be said to injure.  For I maintain, O my friends, that the mere giving or