Athenian:  The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.

Cleinias:  Certainly.

Athenian:  And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the argument is consistently carried out?

Cleinias:  True.

Athenian:  But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet dishonourable, and the term ‘dishonourable’ is applied to justice, will not the just and the honourable disagree?

Cleinias:  What do you mean?

Athenian:  A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to what we are saying.

Cleinias:  To what?

Athenian:  We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of a similar nature.  But we stopped short, because we saw that these sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings.  And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?

Cleinias:  Such appears to be the case.

Athenian:  In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.

Cleinias:  Very true, Stranger.

Athenian:  Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are consistent about these matters.

Cleinias:  Consistent in what?

Athenian:  I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the discussion, but if I did not, let me now state—­

Cleinias:  What?

Athenian:  That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I must proceed to draw a further inference.

Cleinias:  What is it?

Athenian:  That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his will.  Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily.  I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree with him.  But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me—­Well, Stranger, if all this be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes—­shall we legislate or not—­what do you advise?  Certainly we will, I should reply.  Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no such thing as voluntary crime?