Cleinias:  Yes; to them far above all others.

Athenian:  And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be happy?

Cleinias:  Certainly not.

Athenian:  And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and others who were legislators as well as writers?  Is it not true that of all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the best? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they disagree, be deemed ridiculous?  We should consider whether the laws of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents, rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and, after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which may or may not be attainable—­at any rate, we will show our readiness to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the result.  And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be good!

Cleinias:  Excellent; let us do as you say.

Athenian:  Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation, we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be.  Let us, if you please, consider these matters.

Cleinias:  By all means.

Athenian:  Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.

Cleinias:  What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?

Athenian:  I will endeavour to explain.  If I am not mistaken, we are all agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair, and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any inconsistency in this.

Cleinias:  They would be quite right.

Athenian:  Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which are just are fair and honourable, in the term ‘all’ we must include just sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.

Cleinias:  And what is the inference?