Cleinias:  To be sure, Stranger—­more especially if we could procure him a variety of pleasures.

Athenian:  There I can no longer agree, Cleinias:  you amaze me.  To bring him up in such a way would be his utter ruin; for the beginning is always the most critical part of education.  Let us see whether I am right.

Cleinias:  Proceed.

Athenian:  The point about which you and I differ is of great importance, and I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us.  For I maintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor, on the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle state (compare Republic), which I just spoke of as gentle and benign, and is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly ascribe to God.  Now, I say, he among men, too, who would be divine ought to pursue after this mean habit—­he should not rush headlong into pleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow any one, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than ourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more than at any other time the character is engrained by habit.  Nay, more, if I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a woman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully tended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains, and should at that time cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness.

Cleinias:  You need not ask Megillus, Stranger, which of us has most truly spoken; for I myself agree that all men ought to avoid the life of unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course.  And having spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?

Athenian:  Very good, Cleinias; and now let us all three consider a further point.

Cleinias:  What is it?

Athenian:  That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly called by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed the laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature.  And the reflection which lately arose in our minds, that we can neither call these things laws, nor yet leave them unmentioned, is justified; for they are the bonds of the whole state, and come in between the written laws which are or are hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancestral customs of great antiquity, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual, shield and preserve the previously existing written law; but if they depart from right and fall into disorder, then they are like the props of builders which slip away out of their place and cause a universal ruin—­one part drags another down, and the fair super-structure falls because the old foundations are undermined.  Reflecting upon this, Cleinias, you ought to bind together the new state in every possible way, omitting nothing, whether great or small, of what are called laws or manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together, and all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another; and, therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently trifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws.