with having intentionally decided wrong, let him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them, and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the injured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional punishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the public treasury, and to the party who brought the suit.

In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision.  Such causes ought to originate with the people, and the ought also to have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the defendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed.  And in private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state at all.  And for this reason there shall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be chosen by lot;—­they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be inaccessible to entreaties.  The final judgment shall rest with that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most incorruptible form of which human things admit:  this shall be the court established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in the courts of neighbours or of the tribes.

Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be precisely defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial sketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and others omitted.  For the right place of an exact statement of the laws respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the body of legislation;—­let us then expect them at the end.  Hitherto our legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices.  Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the discussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in every part.  At present we have reached the election of magistrates, and this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what preceded.  And now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the work of legislation.

Cleinias:  I like what you have said, Stranger; and I particularly like your manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end of the former one.

Athenian:  Thus far, then, the old men’s rational pastime has gone off well.

Cleinias:  You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?