Athenian:  Let us note the rest of the story.  Observe, that Darius was not the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education.  When he came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country into seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy traces still remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing universal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in his laws the settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised,—­thus creating a feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, and attaching the people to him with money and gifts.  Hence his armies cheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which Cyrus had left behind him.  Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes; and he again was brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion.  Might we not most justly say:  ’O Darius, how came you to bring up Xerxes in the same way in which Cyrus brought up Cambyses, and not to see his fatal mistake?’ For Xerxes, being the creation of the same education, met with much the same fortune as Cambyses; and from that time until now there has never been a really great king among the Persians, although they are all called Great.  And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance, as I maintain; the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led by the sons of very rich and royal persons; for never will boy or man, young or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated.  And this, I say, is what the legislator has to consider, and what at the present moment has to be considered by us.  Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be praised, in that you do not give special honour or a special education to wealth rather than to poverty, or to a royal rather than to a private station, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally commanded them to be given.  For no man ought to have pre-eminent honour in a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because he is swift of foot or fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in him; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue of temperance.

Megillus:  What do you mean, Stranger?

Athenian:  I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?

Megillus:  To be sure.

Athenian:  Then, now hear and judge for yourself:—­Would you like to have for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no control over himself?

Megillus:  Heaven forbid!

Athenian:  Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?

Megillus:  Certainly not.

Athenian:  And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?

Megillus:  Impossible.

Athenian:  Any more than our pattern wise man, whom we exhibited as having his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to true reason, can be intemperate?