Megillus:  Very good.

Athenian:  Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all or the greater and chief part of what he desires.

Megillus:  He would.

Athenian:  Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one common desire of all mankind?

Megillus:  What is it?

Athenian:  The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible,—­at any rate, things human,—­may come to pass in accordance with his soul’s desire.

Megillus:  Certainly.

Athenian:  And having this desire always, and at every time of life, in youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the fulfilment of it.

Megillus:  No doubt.

Athenian:  And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them what they ask for themselves.

Megillus:  We do.

Athenian:  Dear is the son to the father—­the younger to the elder.

Megillus:  Of course.

Athenian:  And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father prays that he may not obtain.

Megillus:  When the son is young and foolish, you mean?

Athenian:  Yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under the influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of right and justice, will join in his father’s prayers?

Megillus:  I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at variance with his reason.  But every state and every individual ought to pray and strive for wisdom.

Athenian:  Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view to wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order all with a view to war.  And to this I replied that there were four virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of legislation; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest—­I mean wisdom and mind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train.  And now the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires.  And if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you should; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not cowardice