Cleinias:  But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in which poets generally compose in States at the present day?  As far as I can observe, except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, there are no regulations like those of which you speak; in other places novelties are always being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the authority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and these pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the Egyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the same.

Athenian:  Most true, Cleinias; and I daresay that I may have expressed myself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of some really existing state of things, whereas I was only saying what regulations I would like to have about music; and hence there occurred a misapprehension on your part.  For when evils are far gone and irremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at times necessary.  But as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you whether you consider such institutions to be more prevalent among the Cretans and Lacedaemonians than among the other Hellenes?

Cleinias:  Certainly they are.

Athenian:  And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would it be an improvement on the present state of things?

Cleinias:  A very great improvement, if the customs which prevail among them were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such as you were just now saying ought to prevail.

Athenian:  Let us see whether we understand one another:—­Are not the principles of education and music which prevail among you as follows:  you compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and just, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong or small and weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand, if he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust, he is wretched and lives in misery?  As the poet says, and with truth:  I sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things, not having justice; let him who ’draws near and stretches out his hand against his enemies be a just man.’  But if he be unjust, I would not have him ’look calmly upon bloody death,’ nor ’surpass in swiftness the Thracian Boreas; ’ and let no other thing that is called good ever be his.  For the goods of which the many speak are not really good:  first in the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then innumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear, and in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant and do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have acquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at once immortal.  But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all these things are the best of possessions,