Cleinias:  We do.

Athenian:  And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both foolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and the other pain.

Cleinias:  Exactly.

Athenian:  Also there are opinions about the future, which have the general name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the expectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further, there is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when embodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.

Cleinias:  I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I were.

Megillus:  I am in the like case.

Athenian:  Let us look at the matter thus:  May we not conceive each of us living beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only, or created with a purpose—­which of the two we cannot certainly know?  But we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings, which pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and herein lies the difference between virtue and vice.  According to the argument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp and never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is the sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the State; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft because golden; and there are several other kinds.  Now we ought always to cooperate with the lead of the best, which is law.  For inasmuch as reason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs have ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the other principles.  And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets will not have been lost, and the meaning of the expression ’superior or inferior to a man’s self’ will become clearer; and the individual, attaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the puppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the same from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should embody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and with other states.  In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly distinguished by us.  And when they have become clearer, education and other institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular that question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to have been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more words than were necessary.

Cleinias:  Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of the length of discourse.

Athenian:  Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears on our present object.

Cleinias:  Proceed.

Athenian:  Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,—­what will be the effect on him?