Megillus:  Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting is third in order.

Athenian:  Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.

Megillus:  I think that I can get as far as the fourth head, which is the frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us Spartans in certain hand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a good beating; there is, too, the so-called Crypteia, or secret service, in which wonderful endurance is shown,—­our people wander over the whole country by day and by night, and even in winter have not a shoe to their foot, and are without beds to lie upon, and have to attend upon themselves.  Marvellous, too, is the endurance which our citizens show in their naked exercises, contending against the violent summer heat; and there are many similar practices, to speak of which in detail would be endless.

Athenian:  Excellent, O Lacedaemonian Stranger.  But how ought we to define courage?  Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and pains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries; which exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even of respectable citizens to melt like wax?

Megillus:  I should say the latter.

Athenian:  In what preceded, as you will remember, our Cnosian friend was speaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves:—­Were you not, Cleinias?

Cleinias:  I was.

Athenian:  Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is overcome by pleasure or by pain?

Cleinias:  I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men deem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who is overcome by pain.

Athenian:  But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not legislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet attacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious flatteries which come from the right?

Cleinias:  Able to meet both, I should say.

Athenian:  Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in either of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid them any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst of them, and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the better of them?  Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that about pain to be found in your laws?  Tell me what there is of this nature among you:—­ What is there which makes your citizen equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?

Megillus:  I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were directed against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great or obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with pleasure; there are some lesser provisions, however, which I might mention.