“And as for wisdom,” pursued Socrates, “what shall we say it is?  Tell me whether are men said to be wise in regard to the things they know, or in regard to those they do not know?” “There can be no doubt,” answered Euthydemus, “but that it is in consideration of what they know; for how can a man be wise in things he knows not?” “Then,” said Socrates, “men are wise on account of their knowledge?” “It cannot be otherwise.”  “Is wisdom anything but what renders us wise?” “No.”  “Wisdom therefore is only knowledge?” “I think so.”  “And do you believe,” said Socrates, “that it is in the power of a man to know everything?” “Not so much as even the hundredth part.”  “It is, then, impossible,” said Socrates, “to find a man who is wise in all things?” “Indeed it is,” said Euthydemus.  “It follows, then,” said Socrates, “that every man is wise in what he knows?” “I believe so.”

“But can we, by this same way of comparison, judge of the nature of good?” “As how?” said Euthydemus.  “Do you think,” said Socrates, “that the same thing is profitable to all men?” “By no means.”  “Do you believe that the same thing may be profitable to one and hurtful to another?” “I think it may.”  “Then is it not the good that is profitable?” “Yes, certainly.”  “Therefore, ’what is profitable is a good to him to whom it is profitable.’” “That is true.”

“Is it not the same with what is beautiful?  For, can you say that a body or a vessel is beautiful and proper for all the world?” “By no means.”  “You will say, then, that it is beautiful in regard to the thing for which it is proper?” “Yes.”  “But tell me whether what is reputed beautiful for one thing has the same relation to another as to that to which it is proper?” “No.”  “Then ’whatever is of any use is reputed beautiful in regard to the thing to which that use relates?’” “I think so.”

“And what say you of courage?” added Socrates.  “Is it an excellent thing?” “Very excellent,” answered Euthydemus.  “But do you believe it to be of use in occasions of little moment?” “Yes; but it is necessary in great affairs.”  “Do you think it of great advantage in dangers,” continued Socrates, “not to perceive the peril we are in?” “I am not of that opinion.”  “At that rate,” said Socrates, “they who are not frightened because they see not the danger are in nowise valiant.”  “There is no doubt of it,” said Euthydemus, “for otherwise there would be some fools, and even cowards, who must be accounted brave.”  “And what are they who fear what is not to be feared?” “They are less brave than the others,” answered Euthydemus.  “They therefore,” said Socrates, “who show themselves valiant in dangerous occasions, are they whom you call brave; and they who behave themselves in them unworthily, are they whom you call cowards?” “Very right.”  “Do you think,” added Socrates, “that any men are valiant in such occasions except they who know how to behave themselves in them?” “I do not think there