men capable to govern, and to be useful to others and to themselves?” “That is what I endeavour to learn,” said Euthydemus, “and what I passionately desire to know.”  “It is a sublime science,” replied Socrates; “it is that we call the royal science, because it truly is the science of kings.  But have you weighed this point, whether a man can excel in that science without being an honest man?” “I have,” said the young man, “and am even of opinion that none but honest men can be good citizens.”  “And are you an honest man?” said Socrates.  “I hope I am,” answered Euthydemus, “as honest a man as another.”  “Tell me,” said Socrates, “can we know who are honest men by what they do, as we know what trade a man is of by his work?” “We may.”  “Then,” said Socrates, “as architects show us their works, can honest men show us theirs likewise?” “No doubt of it,” replied Euthydemus; “and it is no difficult task to show you which are the works of justice, and which those of injustice, that we so often hear mentioned.”  “Shall we,” said Socrates, “make two characters, the one (J) to signify justice, the other (I) to denote injustice; and write under one of them all the works that belong to justice, and under the other all that belong to injustice?” “Do,” said Euthydemus, “if you think fit.”

Socrates, having done what he proposed, continued thus his discourse:—­“Do not men tell lies?” “Very often,” answered Euthydemus.  “Under which head shall we put lying?” “Under that of injustice,” said Euthydemus.  “Do not men sometimes cheat?” “Most certainly.”  “Where shall we put cheating?” said Socrates.  “Under injustice.”  “And doing wrong to one’s neighbour?” “There too.”  “And selling of free persons into slavery?” “Still in the same place.”  “And shall we write none of all these,” said Socrates, “under the head of justice?” “Not one of them,” answered Euthydemus; “it would be strange if we did.”  “But what,” replied Socrates, “when a general plunders an enemy’s city, and makes slaves of all the inhabitants, shall we say that he commits an injustice?” “By no means.”  “Shall we own, then, that he does an act of justice?” “Without doubt.”  “And when he circumvents his enemies in the war, does he not do well?” “Very well.”  “And when he ravages their land, and takes away their cattle and their corn, does he not do justly?” “It is certain he does,” said Euthydemus; “and when I answered you that all these actions were unjust, I thought you had spoken of them in regard only of friend to friend.”  “We must, therefore,” replied Socrates, “put among the actions of justice those very actions we have ascribed to injustice, and we will only establish this distinction, that it is just to behave ourselves so towards our enemies; but that to treat our friends thus is an injustice, because we ought to live with them uprightly, and without any deceit.”  “I think so,” said Euthydemus.  “But,” continued Socrates, “when a general sees that his troops