Aristippus pressed him yet further, and asked him whether he knew any beautiful thing.  “I know a great many,” said Socrates.  “Are they all like one another?” continued Aristippus.  “Not in the least,” answered Socrates, “for they are very different from one another.”  “And how is it possible that two beautiful things should be contrary one to the other?” “This,” said Socrates, “is seen every day in men:  a beautiful make and disposition of body for running is very different from a beautiful make and disposition for wrestling:  the excellence and beauty of a buckler is to cover well him that wears it.  On the contrary, the excellence and beauty of a dart is to be light and piercing.”  “You answer me,” said Aristippus, “as you answered me before, when I asked you whether you knew any good thing.”  “And do you think,” replied Socrates, “that the good and the beautiful are different?  Know you not that the things that are beautiful are good likewise in the same sense?  It would be false to say of virtue that in certain occasions it is beautiful, and in others good.  When we speak of men of honour we join the two qualities, and call them excellent and good.  In our bodies beauty and goodness relate always to the same end.  In a word, all things that are of any use in the world are esteemed beautiful and good, with regard to the subject for which they are proper.”  “At this rate you might find beauty in a basket to carry dung,” said Aristippus.  “Yes, if it be well made for that use,” answered Socrates; “and, on the contrary, I would say that a buckler of gold was ugly if it was ill-made.”  “Would you say,” pursued Aristippus, “that the same thing may be beautiful and ugly at once?” “I would say that it might be good and bad.  Often what is good for hunger is bad for a fever; and what is good for a fever is very bad for hunger; often what is beautiful to be done in running is ugly to be done in wrestling; and what is beautiful to do in wrestling is ugly in running.  For all things are reputed beautiful and good when they are compared with those which they suit or become, as they are esteemed ugly and bad when compared with those they do not become.”

Thus we see that when Socrates said that beautiful houses were the most convenient, he taught plainly enough in what manner we ought to build them, and he reasoned thus:  “Ought not he who builds a house to study chiefly how to make it most pleasant and most convenient?” This proposition being granted, he pursued:  “Is it not a pleasure to have a house that is cool in summer and warm in winter?  And does not this happen in buildings that front towards the south?  For the beams of the sun enter into the apartments in winter, and only pass over the covering in summer.  For this reason the houses that front towards the south ought to be very high, that they may receive the sun in winter; and, on the contrary, those that front towards the north ought to be very low, that they may be less exposed to the cold winds of that quarter.”  In short, he used to say, that he had a very beautiful and very agreeable house, who could live there with ease during all the seasons of the year, and keep there in safety all that he has; but that for painting and other ornaments, there was more trouble in them than pleasure.