“Pray,” says Alcibiades, “explain to me what the law is:  for, as I hear men praised who observe the laws, I imagine that this praise could not be given to those who know not what the law is.”  “It is easy to satisfy you,” answered Pericles:  “the law is only what the people in a general assembly ordain, declaring what ought to be done, and what ought not to be done.”  “And tell me,” added Alcibiades, “do they ordain to do what is good, or what is ill?” “Most certainly what is good.”  Alcibiades pursued:  “And how would you call what a small number of citizens should ordain, in states where the people is not the master, but all is ordered by the advice of a few persons, who possess the sovereignty?” “I would call whatever they ordain a law; for laws are nothing else but the ordinances of sovereigns.”  “If a tyrant then ordain anything, will that be a law?” “Yes, it will,” said Pericles.  “But what then is violence and injustice?” continued Alcibiades; “is it not when the strongest makes himself be obeyed by the weakest, not by consent, but by force only?” “In my opinion it is.”  “It follows then,” says Alcibiades, “that ordinances made by a prince, without the consent of the citizens, will be absolutely unjust.”  “I believe so,” said Pericles; “and cannot allow that the ordinances of a prince, when they are made without the consent of the people, should bear the name of laws.”  “And what the chief citizens ordain, without procuring the consent of the greater number, is that likewise a violence?” “There is no question of it,” answered Pericles; “and in general, every ordinance made without the consent of those who are to obey it, is a violence rather than a law.”  “And is what the populace decree, without the concurrence of the chiefs, to be counted a violence likewise, and not a law?” “No doubt it is,” said Pericles:  “but when I was of your age, I could resolve all these difficulties, because I made it my business to inquire into them, as you do now.”  “Would to God,” cried Alcibiades, “I had been so happy as to have conversed with you then, when you understood these matters better.”  To this purpose was their dialogue.

Critias and Alcibiades, however, continued not long with Socrates, after they believed they had improved themselves, and gained some advantages over the other citizens, for besides that they thought not his conversation very agreeable, they were displeased that he took upon him to reprimand them for their faults; and thus they threw themselves immediately into the public affairs, having never had any other design but that.  The usual companions of Socrates were Crito, Chaerephon, Chaerecrates, Simmias, Cebes, Phaedon, and some others; none of whom frequented him that they might learn to speak eloquently, either in the assemblies of the people, or in the courts of justice before the judges; but that they might become better men, and know how to behave themselves towards their domestics, their relations, their friends, and their fellow-citizens.  All these persons led very innocent lives; and, whether we consider them in their youth or examine their behaviour in a more advanced age, we shall find that they never were guilty of any bad action, nay, that they never gave the least ground to suspect them of being so.