In actual practice we find that the name which a mother applies to her own child is applied by her equally to the children of the women whom her husband might have married.  This state of things may obviously arise from one of three causes, (a) In the first place the name may have been originally that which a mother applied to her own son, and it may have been extended to those who were her nephews in a state of monogamy, or stepsons (=sons of other women by the same father) in a state of polygyny either with or without polyandry. (b) The theory that a name was applied originally to own and collateral relatives has already been discussed, so far as it refers to the “undivided commune.”  The case of regulated promiscuity is different and must be considered here. (c) On the other hand the name which she uses may have been expressive of tribal status or group status, and may have had nothing to do with descent.

It is unnecessary to say much about the first of these possibilities.  First, there is no evidence to show that such a thing has taken place; secondly, we can see no reason why such a thing should take place; thirdly, if such a change of meaning did take place, it is quite clear that we have no grounds for regarding the philological evidence for group marriage as having the slightest significance.

In connection with the second hypothesis—­that the names actually represent the relations formerly existing, it may be well to preface the discussion by a few remarks on the regulation of marriage in Australia.  The rules by which the Australian native is bound, when he sets out to choose a wife, make the area of choice as a rule dependent on his status, that is to say, he must, in order to find a wife, go to another phratry, class, totem-kin, or combination of two of these, membership of which depends on descent, direct or indirect; on the other hand he may be limited by regulations dependent on locality, that is to say he may have to take a wife from a group resident in a certain area.  There is reason to suppose that the latter regulations are the outcome of earlier status regulations which have fallen into desuetude.  However this may be, all that we are here concerned with is the fact that regulations in this case also are virtually dependent on descent, inasmuch as a man is not in practice free to reside where he likes, but remains in his own group, though occasionally he joins that of his wife (this does not apparently affect the exogamic rule).  The groups are therefore to all intents and purposes totem-kins with male descent.