Meanwhile, Capt.  Ward Jackson with his Company Serjeant Major—­J.R.  Hill—­and two platoons (Hepworth and Salmon) went forward with the leading parties to dig their trench from the Sucrerie.  In spite of the heavy fire, and the losses of the attacking Brigades, they started work and actually marked out their trench.  But their task was impossible.  Capt.  Ward Jackson, hit in the back and shoulder and very badly wounded, was only saved by Serjt.  Major Hill, who pluckily carried him out of the fight; and, seeing that the attack had failed, 2nd Lieut.  Hepworth ordered the party back to our lines, where they found the rest of the Battalion in the support line and communication trenches, waiting for the Staffordshires to move forward.

The situation was now critical.  So far as we knew, the attack of the 56th Division on our right had been successful, yet, if we did not meet them by 2 p.m. on the far side of Gommecourt, not only would the operation be a failure, but there was every probability of their being cut off by the Germans in Gommecourt Park.  An attempt was therefore made to re-organize at once for another attack, but this was found impossible.  Our lines, hopelessly sticky from the bad weather, were now congested with dead and wounded; the communication trenches were jammed with stretcher cases and parties coming in, the “up” and “down” rules were not observed, and, above all, the enemy’s artillery enfiladed the front line from the North, the communications from the East.  The Division on our left did nothing by way of counter battery work, and we were left to face their opposing artillery as well as our own.  There was also another serious difficulty to re-organization.  The men were too well trained in their particular duties.  A private soldier who has been told every day for a month that his one duty will be to carry a box of bombs to point Q, cannot readily forget that, and take an efficient part in an ordinary unrehearsed attack.  This, the Staff soon discovered, and, to give time for all arrangements to be made, a new attack was ordered for 3-30 p.m. with artillery and, if possible, a smoke screen.

Meanwhile, the enemy’s artillery was still active, and we suffered. 2nd Lieut.  Callard, a most promising junior officer, was killed, and with him C.S.M.  F. Johnson of “C” Company. 2nd Lieuts.  Russell and Creed were both wounded, and six men killed and several wounded at the same time, nearly all by shells in the communication trenches.

At 3-30 p.m. our Artillery opened once more and our Companies started forward, only to find that the Staffordshires made no move.  It was not surprising.  Many of them had not yet heard the time for the new attack, many were too tired to be much use, no one was really ready though some few tried to leave our lines.  Such an assault was bound to fail, and fortunately Col.  Jones, who was on the spot and just about to start with Capt.  Allen, received the order to cancel the attack.  It would have been a useless waste of lives, for no good could have come of such a half-hearted effort.  Half-an-hour later the Staffordshires were ordered to withdraw and the 5th Leicestershires to take over the front line, while the 5th Lincolnshires came in on our left and relieved the Sherwood Foresters.