The camp at Warlincourt was uncomfortable, and had no officers’ mess, a luxury which we much needed.  However, Colour-Serjeant Collins displayed his usual skill, and, while Major Toller fixed up a home-made marquee of wagon sheets and odd tarpaulins, he managed to carry on the cooking almost in the open.  In spite of the rain which came through the roof and under the sides we had some excellent evenings, and managed to enjoy ourselves.  Our work was mostly training, which now included rapid wiring.  In this we held a competition, finally won by “B” Company, who put out a “double apron” French wire fence 20 yards long in just over four minutes—­a good performance, though the other Companies declared that this fence would not have stopped a rabbit, to say nothing of a Boche.  Meanwhile, Major Toller suddenly received orders to report to the 51st Division to command a battalion of the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, and, much to his disgust, had to leave us just before the fight.  In any case he would have been out of the fight, for the authorities had at last realized the madness of sending a whole Battalion into action, and to avoid a repetition of the post-Hohenzollern difficulties, every Battalion was ordered to leave behind, at Souastre, the 2nd in Command and a proportion of officers, N.C.O.’s and specialists.  These, known as the “Battle Details,” were subsequently increased in number, and later a G.H.Q. publication fixed exactly who would and who would not accompany a battalion into battle.  As Major Beasley had left us at Vimy and not returned, Capt.  Shields became 2nd in Command and had to stay behind, a cruel blow to him, for he was essentially a fighting man.  His Company, “D,” was taken by Lieut.  J.W.  Tomson of “A” Company.  Capt.  Ward Jackson had “A,” Capt.  Knighton “B,” and Capt.  Moore “C.”  R.S.M.  R.E.  Small was accidentally wounded during revolver practice, and during the few weeks that he was away his place was taken by C.S.M.  J. Weir.

During the last two days before the battle the weather became worse, and the rain fell in torrents.  Ours was a comparatively dry sector of the line, and yet our trenches were full of water, so that the country in the neighbourhood of the Somme valley became impossible.  So bad was it that at the last moment the whole offensive was postponed until 48 hours later—­the 1st July.  The attacking Brigades had already occupied their front line and assembly positions before the new cancelling order arrived, and the Staff had now to decide whether to leave them for 48 hours in these hopelessly wet trenches, or take them back to rest—­the latter course would necessitate two marches, in and out, in two days.  The matter was settled by the Corps Commander, who wished to see another practice attack over the Lucheux trenches, so the 4th Leicestershires and 4th Lincolnshires held the line while Staffords and Sherwood Foresters marched back.  It was a long way, nearly eleven miles, from Foncquevillers