At 7-30 p.m., as it was getting dusk, the combined advance started without a barrage.  It was a big frontage for so small a force and parties lost touch with each other amongst the ruins.  “A” Company’s left kept close to the Sherwood Foresters, but the outer flanks of both were “in the air,” for “C” Company could not be found.  It was dark when the South side of the village was reached, and it was found terribly difficult to keep direction amongst the ruins and trenches.  A Lewis Gun Section, under C.S.M.  Wardle, disposed of the only party of the enemy who were encountered, but the post near the Blockhouse could not be found.  Finally at 9-0 p.m. the Sherwood Foresters fell back to Fourmi trench near the main road, and 2nd Lieut.  Dennis, now commanding “A” Company, ordered his platoons to return to their former positions.  We had accomplished nothing.

The original plan had been that we should be relieved as soon as it was dark, but our present line was so uncertain that the relieving Battalion refused to take it over as we had it.  The men were tired out, and it was impossible to expect them to make another attempt to form a line round the village.  “C” Company were found, but too far North to link up with the others.  Eventually, at 2-0 a.m. on the 25th, we were ordered to withdraw all our Companies and evacuate the village.  This we did by 4-0 a.m.  What was left of the Battalion then marched back to where we had left our greatcoats, while the Sherwood Foresters took over the line north and west of Pontruet.  The Adjutant saw the last parties out of the village, and the Colonel, though tired out, insisted on going round the lines and visiting each platoon as it came in.

The following day we received this message from General Boyd:—­

“Please congratulate Lieut.-Colonel Griffiths and the 1/5th Bn.  Leicestershire Regiment on the good fight they put up yesterday, and tell them I am quite satisfied.  They captured many prisoners and accounted for numbers of the enemy.  Owing to unexpected reinforcements they attacked an enemy twice as strong as themselves, and moreover in a strong position.  Although we did not reach our objective, the enemy was prevented from reinforcing the troops opposed to the Division on our right.”

     (sd.) G.F.  Boyd, Major-General.

We had lost one Company Commander and three subalterns killed, one Company Commander and six subalterns wounded.  Of the rank and file, thirty were killed, of whom three were Serjeants, one hundred were wounded, and eight were missing.  But we had proved that five platoons could clear a village held by three Battalions (so said one of the prisoners) of the enemy; we had shown that when N.C.O.’s became casualties, private soldiers were ready to assume command and become leaders, and, most important of all, the battle had proved to each individual soldier that if he went with his bayonet he was irresistible.