preliminary bombardment, and to concentrate everything on the defence of the Reserve Line, which must be held at all costs.  Some of the N.C.O.’s and men grumbled a little at what they called giving up the front line, more especially as patrols reported that the enemy was busy strengthening his wire, which did not seem the prelude to an attack.  Finally, by 2-0 a.m. on the 25th all was ready.  The Staff at Corps Headquarters, ten miles back, slept in their boots, all support and reserve Battalions moved to “battle” positions and stood to, we in the line behaved very much as usual.  All waited for dawn.

Dawn came at last—­the quietest since war began, not a shot was fired.  Morning followed and high noon, still no movement; the Staff breathed a sigh of relief, the Infantry groused, and we occupied our front line, preparing to pass a normal night.  However, this was not to be.  We had scarcely posted our night sentries when at 8-30 p.m. came another message to say that the prisoner who had originally caused the alarm had remembered that the attack was for the 26th, not the 25th.  All precautions were to be taken as for the previous night.  With this arrived a long epistle from the Intelligence department, showing that various new dumps and camouflaged screens had been seen in the German lines, motor transport had been increased, etc. etc. etc.—­all tending to confirm their wretched prisoner’s statement.  Once more we evacuated our front line, once more we waited and once more we were disappointed.  The 26th was as quiet as the 25th, and, except for a humorous telephone message from “C” Company, which caused much laughter as far back as Divisional Headquarters, there was nothing to disturb the morning’s peace.

The following evening the 11th Division took over our sector, and we marched out—­the Headquarters and Left Half Battalion to Sailly, Right Half to Labourse.  It was a cold and rather miserable night, for, owing to a sudden move of our Q.M.  Stores to Noeux les Mines, we had no blankets.  Meanwhile, all schools and classes were closed, and those students who had not been taken to stop the German advance on Amiens returned to us.  The situation was serious, and another blow was expected at any moment in the neighbourhood of Vimy.  The Canadian Corps was chosen to oppose this, and we were consequently ordered to relieve any units of that Corps still left on “Hill 70.”  But on the 28th March before relief had started the expected attack came—­at Oppy.  It was a miserable failure, we lost a few front line trenches, but our line stood firm; however, the Canadians were wanted in a hurry and we were sent up to relieve them at once.  The other Battalions went into the front line, we relieved the 46th Canadians in support round Loos Crassier and Railway Alley.  Relief was complete by 10-35 p.m., an almost incredible performance, considering that there had been no time for reconnaissance and practically no arrangements made for guides.