Good relations between individuals, freedom from hatred and violence and oppression, genera diffusion of education, leisure rationally employed, the progress of art and science—­these seem to me among the most important ends that a political theory ought to have in view.  I do not believe that they can be furthered, except very rarely, by revolution and war; and I am convinced that at the present moment they can only be promoted by a diminution in the spirit of ruthlessness generated by the war.  For these reasons, while admitting the necessity and even utility of Bolshevism in Russia, I do not wish to see it spread, or to encourage the adoption of its philosophy by advanced parties in the Western nations.

VI

WHY RUSSIAN COMMUNISM HAS FAILED

The civilized world seems almost certain, sooner or later, to follow the example of Russia in attempting a Communist organization of society.  I believe that the attempt is essential to the progress and happiness of mankind during the next few centuries, but I believe also that the transition has appalling dangers.  I believe that, if the Bolshevik theory as to the method of transition is adopted by Communists in Western nations, the result will be a prolonged chaos, leading neither to Communism nor to any other civilized system, but to a relapse into the barbarism of the Dark Ages.  In the interests of Communism, no less than in the interests of civilization, I think it imperative that the Russian failure should be admitted and analysed.  For this reason, if for no other, I cannot enter into the conspiracy of concealment which many Western Socialists who have visited Russia consider necessary.

I shall try first to recapitulate the facts which make me regard the Russian experiment as a failure, and then to seek out the causes of failure.

The most elementary failure in Russia is in regard to food.  In a country which formerly produced a vast exportable surplus of cereals and other agricultural produce, and in which the non-agricultural population is only 15 per cent. of the total, it ought to be possible, without great difficulty, to provide enough food for the towns.  Yet the Government has failed badly in this respect.  The rations are inadequate and irregular, so that it is impossible to preserve health and vigour without the help of food purchased illicitly in the markets at speculative prices.  I have given reasons for thinking that the breakdown of transport, though a contributory cause, is not the main reason for the shortage.  The main reason is the hostility of the peasants, which, in turn, is due to the collapse of industry and to the policy of forced requisitions.  In regard to corn and flour, the Government requisitions all that the peasant produces above a certain minimum required for himself and his family.  If, instead, it exacted a fixed amount as rent, it would not destroy his incentive to production, and would not provide nearly such a strong motive for concealment.  But this plan would have enabled the peasants to grow rich, and would have involved a confessed abandonment of Communist theory.  It has therefore been thought better to employ forcible methods, which led to disaster, as they were bound to do.