Lack of fuel has been another very grave source of trouble.  Before the war coal came mostly from Poland and the Donetz Basin.  Poland is lost to Russia, and the Donetz Basin was in the hands of Denikin, who so destroyed the mines before retreating that they are still not in working order.  The result is a practically complete absence of coal.  Oil, which is equally important in Russia, was also lacking until the recent recovery of Baku.  All that I saw on the Volga made me believe that real efficiency has been shown in reorganizing the transport of oil, and doubtless this will do something to revive industry.  But the oil used to be worked very largely by Englishmen, and English machinery is much needed for refining it.  In the meantime, Russia has had to depend upon wood, which involves immense labour.  Most of the houses are not warmed in winter, so that people live in a temperature below freezing-point.  Another consequence of lack of fuel was the bursting of water-pipes, so that people in Petrograd, for the most part, have to go down to the Neva to fetch their water—­a considerable addition to the labour of an already overworked day.

I find it difficult to believe that, if greater efficiency had existed in the Government, the food and fuel difficulties could not have been considerably alleviated.  In spite of the needs of the army, there are still many horses in Russia; I saw troops of thousands of horses on the Volga, which apparently belonged to Kalmuk tribes.  By the help of carts and sledges, it ought to be possible, without more labour than is warranted by the importance of the problem, to bring food and timber into Moscow and Petrograd.  It must be remembered that both cities are surrounded by forests, and Moscow at least is surrounded by good agricultural land.  The Government has devoted all its best energies hitherto to the two tasks of war and propaganda, while industry and the food problem have been left to a lesser degree of energy and intelligence.  It is no doubt probable that, if peace is secured, the economic problems will receive more attention than hitherto.  But the Russian character seems less adapted to steady work of an unexciting nature than to heroic efforts on great occasions; it has immense passive endurance, but not much active tenacity.  Whether, with the menace of foreign invasion removed, enough day-by-day detailed energy would exist for the reorganization of industry, is a doubtful question, as to which only time can decide.

This leads to the conclusion—­which I think is adopted by most of the leading men in Russia—­that it will be very difficult indeed to save the revolution without outside economic assistance.  Outside assistance from capitalist countries is dangerous to the principles of Communism, as well as precarious from the likelihood of fresh causes of quarrel.  But the need of help is urgent, and if the policy of promoting revolution elsewhere were to succeed, it would probably render