with purely native Egyptian questions.[68] I, and
others who shared my views, considered that those
who cried “Egypt for the Egyptians” on
the house-tops had gone off on an entirely wrong scent
because, even had they attained their ends, nothing
approaching to Egyptian autonomy would have been realised.
The Capitulations would still have barred the way to
all important legislation and to the removal of those
defects in the administration of which the Egyptians
most complained. When the prominent part played
by resident Europeans in the political and social
life of Egypt is considered, it is indeed little short
of ridiculous to speak of Egyptian autonomy if at
the same time a system is preserved under which no
important law can be made applicable to an Englishman,
a Frenchman, or a German, without its detailed provisions
having received the consent, not only of the King
of England, the President of the French Republic,
and the German Emperor, but also that of the President
of the United States, the King of Denmark, and every
other ruling Potentate in Europe. We therefore
held that the only possible method by which the evils
of extreme personal government could be averted, and
by which the country could be provided with a workable
legislative machine, was to include in the term “Egyptians”
all the dwellers in Egypt, and to devise some plan
by which the European and Egyptian elements of society
would be fused together to such an extent at all events
as to render them capable of cooperating in legislative
effort. It may perhaps be hoped that by taking
a first step in this direction some more thorough
fusion may possibly follow in the future.
As I have already mentioned, it would have been premature
to deal with this question prior to 1904, for any
serious modification of the regime of the Capitulations
could not be considered as within the domain of practical
politics so long as all the Powers, and more especially
France and England, were pulling different ways.
But directly that agreement was signed I resolved
to take the question up, all the more so because what
was then known as the Secret Agreement, but which has
since that time been published, contained the following
very important clause:
In the event of their (His Britannic
Majesty’s Government) considering it desirable
to introduce in Egypt reforms tending to assimilate
the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in
other civilised countries, the Government of the
French Republic will not refuse to entertain
any such proposals, on the understanding that
His Britannic Majesty’s Government will agree
to entertain the suggestions that the Government
of the French Republic may have to make to them
with a view of introducing similar reforms in
Morocco.
I was under no delusion as to the formidable nature
of the obstacles which stood in the way of reform.
Moreover, I held very strongly that even if it had
been possible, by diplomatic negotiations with the