forward will be taken in the solution of the economic problem which constitutes the main Chinese difficulty.  The very rudimentary ideas entertained by the Chinese themselves in the matter of applying funds to productive works is sufficiently illustrated by the episode mentioned by Mr. Bland, where he tells us that “the Szechuan Railway Company directors made provision for the building of their line by the appointment of station-masters”; while the fact that but a short time ago 1400 German machine guns, costing L500 apiece, which had never been used or paid for, were lying at Shanghai, indicates the manner in which it is not only possible but highly probable that the loan funds under exclusively Chinese supervision would be frittered away on unproductive objects.

Those, indeed, who have had some practical experience of financial administration in Eastern countries may well entertain some doubts as to whether supervision which only embraces the expenditure, and does not apply to the revenue, will be sufficient to meet all the requirements of the case.  The results so far attained by the more limited scheme of supervision do not appear to have been satisfactory.  Herr Rump was appointed auditor to the German section of the Tientsin-P’ukou Railway, but Mr. Bland tells us that “the auditorship on this railway has proved worse than useless as a preventive of official peculation.”  On the other hand, the system of collecting the revenue is in the highest degree defective.  It violates flagrantly a principle which, from the days of Adam Smith downwards, has always been regarded as the corner-stone of any sound financial administration.  “For every tael officially accounted for by the provincial authorities,” Mr. Bland says, in words which recall to my mind the Egyptian fiscal system under the regime of Ismail Pasha, “at least five are actually collected from the taxpayers.”

It is, therefore, earnestly to be hoped that the diplomatists and capitalists of Europe will—­both in the interests of the investing public and in those of the Chinese people—­stand firm and insist on adequate financial control as a preliminary and essential condition to the advance of funds.

As to whether the recently established Republic is destined to last or whether it will prove a mere ephemeral episode in the life-history of China, there seems to be much divergence of opinion among those authorities who are most qualified to speak on the subject.  Mr. Bland’s views on this point are, however, quite clear.  He thinks that Confucianism, and all the political and social habits of thought which are the outcome of Confucianism, have “become ingrained in every fibre of the national life,” and that they constitute the “fundamental cause of the longevity of China’s social structure and of the innate strength of her civilisation.”  He refuses to believe that Young China, which is imbued with “a doctrinaire spirit of political speculation,” though it may tinker with the superstructure, will