Sir George Arthur, writing in the Fortnightly Review, strongly condemns this “cynical disavowal” of Lord Wolseley’s proclamation.  I have nothing to say in favour of the issue of that proclamation.  I am very clearly of opinion that, as it was issued, it was wise that it should be cancelled.  For, in truth, subsequent events showed that the forecast made by Lord Wolseley and by Gordon was erroneous, in that it credited the Mahdi with a power of offence which he was far from possessing.  No serious difficulty arose in defending the frontier of Egypt from Dervish attack.  The overthrow of the Mahdi’s power, though eminently desirable, was very far from constituting an imperious necessity such as was commonly supposed to exist in 1885.  In this instance, therefore, it appears to me that the diplomatists and politicians gauged the true nature of the situation somewhat more accurately than the soldiers.

More than this, I conceive that, in all civilised countries, the theory of government is that a question of peace or war is one to be decided by politicians.  The functions of the soldier are supposed to be confined, in the first place, to advising on the purely military aspects of the issue involved; and, in the second place, to giving effect to any decisions at which the Government may arrive.  The practice in this matter not infrequently differs somewhat from the theory.  The soldier, who is generally prone to advocate vigorous action, is inclined to encroach on the sphere which should properly be reserved for the politician.  The former is often masterful, and the latter may be dazzled by the glitter of arms, or too readily lured onwards by the persuasive voice of some strategist to acquire an almost endless succession of what, in technical language, are called “keys” to some position, or—­to employ a metaphor of which the late Lord Salisbury once made use in writing to me—­“to try and annex the moon in order to prevent its being appropriated by the planet Mars.”  When this happens, a risk is run that the soldier, who is himself unconsciously influenced by a very laudable desire to obtain personal distinction, may practically dictate the policy of the nation without taking a sufficiently comprehensive view of national interests.  Considerations of this nature have more especially been, from time to time, advanced in connection with the numerous frontier wars which have occurred in India.  That they contain a certain element of truth can scarcely be doubted.

For these reasons, it appears to me that the application of the principle advocated by Lord Wolseley requires much care and watchfulness.  Probably, the wisest plan will be that each case should be decided on its own merits with reference to the special circumstances of the situation, which may sometimes demand the fusion, and sometimes the separation, of military and political functions.