The objections to anything in the nature of a division of responsibility, at all events so long as military operations are in actual progress, are, indeed, obvious, and are now very generally recognised.  Those who are familiar with the history of the revolutionary war will remember the baneful influence exercised by the Aulic Council over the actions of the Austrian commanders.[56] There can, in fact, be little doubt that circumstances may occur when the principle advocated by Lord Wolseley may most advantageously be adopted; but it is, I venture to think, one which has to be applied with much caution, especially when the question is not whether there should be a temporary cessation of hostilities—­a point on which the view of the officer in command of the troops would naturally carry the greatest weight—­but also involves the larger issue of the terms on which peace should finally be concluded.  I am not at all sure that, in deciding on the issues which, under the latter contingency, must necessarily come under consideration, the employment of a soldier, in preference to a politician or diplomatist, is always a wise proceeding.  Soldiers, equally with civilians, are liable to make erroneous forecasts of the future, and to mistake the general situation with which they have to deal.  I can give a case in point.

When, in January 1885, Khartoum fell, the question whether the British army should be withdrawn, or should advance and reconquer the Soudan, had to be decided.  Gordon, whose influence on public opinion, great before, had been enhanced by his tragic death, had strongly recommended the policy of “smashing the Mahdi.”  Lord Wolseley adopted Gordon’s opinion.  “No frontier force,” he said, “can keep Mahdiism out of Egypt, and the Mahdi sooner or later must be smashed, or he will smash you.”  These views were shared by Lord Kitchener, Sir Redvers Buller, Sir Charles Wilson, and by the military authorities generally.[57] Further, the alleged necessity of “smashing the Mahdi,” on the ground that his success in the Soudan would be productive of serious results elsewhere, exercised a powerful influence on British public opinion at this period, although the best authorities on Eastern politics were at the time aware that the fears so generally entertained in this connection were either groundless or, at all events, greatly exaggerated.[58] Under these circumstances, it was decided to “smash the Mahdi,” and accordingly a proclamation, giving effect to the declared policy of the British Government, was issued.  Shortly afterwards, the Penjdeh incident occurred.  Public opinion in England somewhat calmed down, having found its natural safety-valve in an acrimonious parliamentary debate, in which the Government narrowly escaped defeat.  The voices of politicians and diplomatists, which had been to some degree hushed by the din of arms, began to be heard.  The proclamation was cancelled.  The project of reconquering the Soudan was postponed to a more convenient period.  It was, in fact, accomplished thirteen years later, under circumstances which differed very materially from those which prevailed in 1885.  In June 1885, the Government of Lord Salisbury succeeded to that of Mr. Gladstone, and, though strongly urged to undertake the reconquest of the Soudan, confirmed the decision of its predecessors.