This is not the place to enter into any lengthy discussion upon Indian affairs.  It may be said, however, that the Indian history of the last few years certainly gives cause for some anxiety.  Attention was at one time too exclusively paid to frontier policy, which constitutes only one, and that not the most important, element of the complex Indian problem.

That the policy of “masterly inactivity,” to use the phrase epigrammatically, but perhaps somewhat incorrectly, applied to the line of action advocated by Lord Lawrence in 1869, required some modifications as the onward movement of Russia in Asia developed, will scarcely be contested by the most devoted of Lawrentian partisans and followers.  That those modifications were wisely introduced is a proposition the truth of which it is difficult to admit.  The portion of Lord Lawrence’s programme which was necessarily temporary, inasmuch as it depended on the circumstances of the time, was rejected without taking sufficient account of the further and far more important portion which was of permanent application.  This latter portion was defined in an historic and oft-quoted despatch which he indited on the eve of his departure from India, and which may be regarded as his political testament.  In this despatch, Lord Lawrence, speaking with all the authority due to a lifelong acquaintance with Indian affairs, laid down the broad general principle that the strongest security of our rule lay “in the contentment, if not in the attachment, of the masses."[22] The truth of this general principle was at one time too much neglected.  Under the influence of a predominant militarism acting on too pliant politicians, vast military expenditure was incurred.  Territory lying outside the natural geographical frontier of India was occupied, the acquisition of which was condemned not merely by sound policy, but also by sound strategy.  Taxation was increased, and, generally, the material interests of the natives of India were sacrificed and British Imperial rule exposed to subsequent danger, in order to satisfy the exigencies of a school of soldier-politicians who only saw one, and that the most technical, aspect of a very wide and complex question.

Neither, unfortunately, is there any sure guarantee that the mistakes, which it is now almost universally admitted were made, will not recur.  Where, indeed, are we to look for any effective check?  The rulers of India, whether they sit in Calcutta or London, may again be carried away by the partial views of an influential class, or of a few masterful individuals.  It is absurd to speak of creating free institutions in India to control the Indian Government.  Experience has shown that parliamentary action in England not infrequently degenerates into acrimonious discussion and recrimination dictated by party passion; in any case, it is generally too late to change the course of events.  Still less reliance can be placed on the action of the British Press, which falls a