he unquestionably had in view, viz. that of tightening the bonds between the Mother country and the colonies.  But that is what they deny.  They rely mainly on a common ancestry, common traditions, a common language, and a common religion to cement those bonds; and, moreover, they hold, to quote the words of an able article published two years ago in the Round Table:  “The chief reason for the sentiment of Imperial unity is the conscious or unconscious belief of the people of the Empire in their own political system....  There is in the British Empire a unity which it is often difficult to discern amid the conflict of racial nationalities, provincial politics, and geographical differences.  It is a unity which is based upon the conviction amongst the British self-governing communities that the political system of the Empire is indispensable to their own progress, and that to allow it to collapse would be fatal alike to their happiness and their self-respect.”  They therefore demur to granting special economic concessions which—­unless, indeed, a policy of perfect Free Trade throughout the Empire could be adopted—­they think, whatever might be the immediate result, would eventually cause endless friction and tend to weaken rather than strengthen the Imperial connection.

Further, it is to be observed that whatever exacerbation has been caused by party exaggeration and misrepresentation, it is more than doubtful whether Lord Milner’s special accusation against the party system can be made good, for it must be remembered that Mr. Chamberlain’s original programme was strongly opposed by many who, on mere party grounds, were earnestly desirous to accord it a hearty welcome.  Rather would it be true to say that, looking back on past events, it is amazing that any one of political experience could have imagined for one moment that a proposal which touched the opinions and interests of almost every individual in the United Kingdom, and which was wholly at variance with the views heretofore held by Mr. Chamberlain himself, could have been kept outside the whirlpool of party politics.  “A great statesman,” it has been truly said, “must have two qualities; the first is prudence, the second imprudence.”  Cavour has often been held up as the example of an eminent man who combined, in his own person, these apparently paradoxical qualities.  Accepting the aphorism as true, it has to be applied with the corollary that the main point is to know when to allow imprudence to predominate over prudence.  It is difficult to resist the conclusion that when Mr. Chamberlain launched his programme, which Lord Milner admits “burst like a bombshell in the camp of his friends,” he overweighted the balance on the imprudent side.  The heat with which the controversy has been conducted, and which Lord Milner very rightly deplores, must be attributed mainly to this cause rather than to any inherent and, to a great extent, unavoidable defects in the party system.