Nor can I stop to dwell upon the very important subject of the delegation or devolution of powers by Parliament to subordinate bodies.  I will only say that devolution may be, and I think ought to be, of two kinds, which we may define as regional and functional.  To regional bodies for large areas (which might either be directly elected or constituted by indirect election from the local government authorities within each area) might be allotted much of the legislative power of Parliament in regard to private Bills, together with general control over those public functions, such as Education and Public Health, which are now mainly in the hands of local authorities.  Of functional devolution the most important expression would be the establishment of a National Industrial Council and of a series of councils or boards for various industries endowed with quasi-legislative authority; by which I mean that they should be empowered by statute to draft proposals for legislation of a defined kind, which would ultimately receive their validity from Parliament, perhaps without necessarily passing through the whole of the elaborate process by which ordinary legislation is enacted.  I believe there are many who share my conviction that a development in this direction represents the healthiest method of introducing a real element of industrial self-government.  But for the moment we are concerned with it as a means of relieving Parliament from some very difficult functions which Parliament does not perform conspicuously well, without qualifying its supreme and final authority.

One final point.  If it is true, as I have argued, that the decay of the prestige and efficiency of Parliament is due to the fact that it is already overloaded with functions and responsibilities, it must be obvious that to add to this burden the responsibility for controlling the conduct of great industries, such as the railways and the mines, would be to ensure the breakdown of our system of government, already on the verge of dislocation.  In so far as it may be necessary to undertake on behalf of the community the ownership and conduct of any great industrial or commercial concern, I submit that it is essential that it should not be brought under the direct control of a ministerial department responsible to Parliament.  Yet the ultimate responsibility for the right conduct of any such undertaking (e.g. the telephones, electric supply, or forests) must, when it is assumed by the State, rest upon Parliament.  How is this ultimate responsibility to be met?  Surely in the way in which it is already met in the case of the Ecclesiastical Commissioners or the Port of London Authority—­by setting up, under an Act of Parliament, an appropriate body in each case, and by leaving to it a large degree of freedom of action, subject to the terms of the Act and to the inalienable power of Parliament to alter the Act.  In such a case the Act could define how the authority should be constituted, on what principles its functions should be performed, and how its profits, if it made profits, should be distributed.  And I suggest that there is no reason why the Post Office itself should not be dealt with in this way.