When we pass to finance, the inefficiency of parliamentary control becomes painfully clear.  It is true that a good deal of parliamentary time is devoted to the discussion of the estimates.  But how much of this time is given to motions to reduce the salary of the Foreign Secretary by L100 in order to call attention to what is happening in China?  Parliament never, in fact, attempts any searching analysis of the expenditure in this department or that.  It cannot do so, because the national accounts are presented in a form which makes such discussion very difficult.  The establishment of an Estimates Committee is an advance.  But even an Estimates Committee cannot do such work without the aid of a whole series of special bodies intimately acquainted with the working of various departments.  In short, the House of Commons has largely lost control over national expenditure.  As for the control of administration, we have already seen how inadequate that is, and why it is inadequate.

These deficiencies must be corrected if Parliament is to regain its prestige, and if our system of government is to attain real efficiency.  For this purpose two things are necessary:  in the first place, substantial changes in the procedure of Parliament; in the second place, the delegation to subordinate bodies of such powers as can be appropriately exercised by them without impairing the supreme authority of Parliament as the mouthpiece of the nation.  I cannot here attempt to discuss these highly important matters in any detail.  In regard to procedure, I can only suggest that the most valuable reform would be the institution of a series of committees each concerned with a different department of Government.  The function of these committees would be to investigate and criticise the organisation and normal working of the departments, not to deal with questions of broad policy; for these ought to be dealt with in relation to national policy as a whole, and they must, therefore, be the concern of the minister and of the Cabinet, subject to the overriding authority of Parliament as a whole.  In order to secure that this distinction is maintained, and in order to avoid the defects of the French committee system under which independent rapporteurs disregard and override the authority of the ministers, and thus gravely undermine their responsibility, it would be necessary not only that each committee should include a majority of supporters of Government, but that the chair should be occupied by the minister or his deputy.

DEVOLUTION