The psychological effect of this state of things must be profound.  And there is another consideration.  The very name of the House of Commons (Communes, not common people) implies that it represents organised communities, with a character and personality and tradition of their own—­boroughs or counties.  So it did until 1885.  Now it largely represents totally unreal units which exist only for the purpose of the election.  The only possible means of overcoming these defects of the single member system is some mode of proportional representation—­perhaps qualified by the retention of single members in those boroughs or counties which are just large enough to be entitled to one member.

The main objection taken to proportional representation is that it would probably involve small and composite majorities which would not give sufficient authority to ministries.  But our chief complaint is that the authority of modern ministries is too great, their power too unchecked.  In the middle of the nineteenth century, when our system worked most smoothly, parties were composite, and majorities were small—­as they usually ought to be, if the real balance of opinion in the country is to be reflected.  The result was that the control of Parliament over the Cabinet was far more effective than it is to-day; the Cabinet could not ride roughshod over the House; and debates really influenced votes, as they now scarcely ever do.  The immense majorities which have been the rule since 1885 are not healthy.  They are the chief cause of the growth of Cabinet autocracy.  And they are due primarily to the working of the single-member constituency.

The second ground of distrust is the belief that Parliament is unduly dominated by party; that its members cannot speak and vote freely; that the Cabinet always gets its way because it is able to hold over members, in terrorem, the threat of a general election, which means a fine of L1000 a head; and that (what creates more suspicion than anything) the policy of parties is unduly influenced by the subscribers of large amounts to secret party funds.  I am a profound believer in organised parties as essential to the working of our system.  But I also believe that there is real substance in these complaints, though they are often exaggerated.  What is the remedy?  First, smaller majorities, and a greater independence of the individual member, which would follow from a change in the methods of election.  And, secondly, publicity of accounts in regard to party funds.  There is no reason why an honest party should be ashamed of receiving large gifts for the public ends it serves, and every reason why it should be proud of receiving a multitude of small gifts.  I very strongly hold that in politics, as in industry, the best safeguard against dishonest dealings, and the surest means of restoring confidence, is to be found in the policy of “Cards on the table.”  Is there any reason why we Liberals should not begin by boldly adopting, in our own case, this plainly Liberal policy?