First, as to bureaucracy.  It is manifest that there has been an immense increase in the number, the functions, and the power of public officials.  This is not merely due to the war.  It has been going on for a long time—­ever since, in fact, we began the deliberate process of national reconstruction in the years following 1832.  In itself this increase has not been a bad thing; on the contrary, it has been the only possible means of carrying into effect the great series of reforms which marked the nineteenth century.  And may I here underline the fact that we Liberals, in particular, have no right to criticise the process, since we have been mainly responsible for it, at any rate in all its early stages.  When our predecessors set up the first Factory Inspectors in 1833, and so rendered possible the creation of a whole code of factory laws; when they created the first rudimentary Education Office in 1839, and so set to work the men who have really moulded our national system of education; when they set up a bureaucratic Poor Law Board in 1841, which shaped our Poor Law Policy, and a Public Health Board in 1848, which gradually worked out our system of Public Health—­when they did these things, they were beginning a process which has been carried further with every decade.  If you like, they were laying the foundations of bureaucracy; but they were also creating the only machinery by which vast, beneficial and desperately needed measures of social reform could be carried into effect.

And there is yet another thing for which Liberalism must assume the responsibility.  When Gladstone instituted the Civil Service Commission in 1853, and the system of appointment by competitive examination in 1870, he freed the Civil Service from the reputation for corruption and inefficiency which had clung to it; and he ensured that it should attract, as it has ever since done, much of the best intellect of the nation.  But this very fact inevitably increased the influence of the Civil Service, and encouraged the expansion of its functions.  If you put a body of very able men in charge of a department of public service, it is certain that they will magnify their office, take a disproportionate view of its claims, and incessantly strive to increase its functions and its staff.  This is not only natural, it is healthy—­so long as the process is subjected to efficient criticism and control.

But the plain fact is that the control is inadequate.  The vast machine of government has outgrown the power of the controlling mechanism.

We trust for the control of the immense bureaucratic machine, almost entirely to the presence, at the head of each department, of a political minister directly responsible to Parliament.  We hold the minister responsible for everything that happens in his office, and we regard this ministerial responsibility as one of the keystones of our system.  But when we reflect that the minister is distracted by a multitude of