I could give other instances of failure, but I do not wish to depress you, and there are cheering things we may look at.  It is a matter of great relief and congratulation that the policy of mandates really does appear to be becoming effective, and one of the greatest activities of the League.  Nothing is better than the conception which the mandate clause embodies, that the old ideas of conquest are to be put aside; that you are not to allow nations to go out and take chunks of territory for themselves; that they must hold new territory not for themselves, but on behalf of and for the benefit of mankind at large.  This is at the bottom of mandates.  Since I am speaking on behalf of Professor Murray, I ought to remind you of the provisions of the Covenant for the protection of racial linguistic minorities, and minorities in different countries.  It has not yet become an effective part of the machinery of the League, but I look forward to the time when we shall have established the doctrine that all racial minorities are entitled to be treated on a footing absolutely equal with other nationals of the country in which they live.  If that could be established, one of the great difficulties in the way of international co-operation in the spirit of peace will be removed.

THE MISTAKE OF VERSAILLES

These are the two aspects I wanted to bring before you.  If we are to get down to the root of the matter; if we are to uproot the old jungle theory of international relations, we must recognise that the chief danger and difficulty before us is what may be described as excessive nationalism.  We have to recognise in this and other countries that a mere belief in narrow national interests will never really take you anywhere.  You must recognise that humanity can only exist and prosper as a whole, and that you cannot separate the nation in which you live, and say you will work for its prosperity and welfare alone, without considering that its prosperity and welfare depend on that of others.  And the differences on that point go right through a great deal of the political thought of the day.

Take the question of reparations.  I am not going to discuss in detail what ought to be done in that difficult and vexed question, but I want to call your attention to the mistake which was originally made, and which we have never yet been able to retrieve.  The fundamental error of Versailles was the failure to recognise that even in dealing with a conquered enemy you can only successfully proceed by co-operation.  That was the mistake—­the idea that the victorious Powers could impose their will without regard to the feelings and desires and national sentiment of their enemy, even though he was beaten.  For the first time in the history of peace conferences, the vanquished Power was not allowed to take part in any real discussion of the terms of the treaty.  The attitude adopted was, “These are our terms,