FRONTIER RAIDS

Few people here in England reading of raids on the North-West Frontier in India realise the full horror of these outrages.  What generally happens is that in the small hours of the morning, a wretched village is suddenly assailed by a gang of perhaps 50, perhaps 200, well-armed raiders, who put out sentries, picket the approaches, and conduct the operation on the most skilful lines.  The houses of the wealthiest men are attacked and looted; probably several villagers are brutally murdered—­and probably one or two unhappy youths or women are carried off to be held up to ransom.  Sometimes the raid is on a larger scale, sometimes it is little more than an armed dacoity.  But there is nearly always a tale of death and damage.  Not infrequently, however, our troops, our militia, our frontier constabulary, our armed police, or the village chigha or hue-and-cry party are successful in repelling and destroying the raiders.  Our officers are untiring in their vigilance, and not infrequently the district officers and the officers of their civil forces are out three or four nights a week after raiding gangs.  Statistics in such matters are often misleading and generally dull, but it may be of interest to state that from the 1st April, 1920, to the 31st March, 1921, when the tribal ebullition consequent on the third Afghan war had begun to die down, there were in the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province 391 raids in which 153 British subjects were killed and 157 wounded, in which 310 British subjects were kidnapped and some L20,000 of property looted.  These raids are often led by outlaws from British territory; but each tribe is responsible for what emanates from or passes through its limits—­and when the bill against a tribe has mounted up beyond the possibility of settlement, there is nothing for it but punitive military operations.  Hence the large number of military expeditions that have taken place on this border within the last half century.

Now this brings us to the question so often asked by the advocates of what is called the Forward policy:  “If the tribes give so much trouble, why not go in and conquer them once and for all and occupy the country up to the Durand line?” It sounds an attractive solution, and it has frequently been urged on paper by expert soldiers.  But the truth is that to advance our frontier only means advancing the seat of trouble, and that the occupation of tribal territory by force is a much more formidable undertaking than it sounds.  We have at this moment before us a striking proof of the immense difficulty and expense of attempting to tame and occupy even a comparatively small tract of tribal territory in the Waziristan operations.  Those operations have been going on for two and a half years.  At the start there were ample troops, ample equipment, and no financial stringency.  The operations were conducted, if