Thirdly, More Financial Publicity.  Secrecy as to profits, which always suggests that they are as large as to make one ashamed of them, has been the bane of the coal-mining industry.  For nearly half a century wages have borne some relation to selling prices, and there have been quarterly audits of typical selected mines in each district by joint auditors appointed by the owners and the miners.  But over profits a curtain was drawn, except in so far as the compulsory filing at Somerset House by public companies of a document called a Statement in the form of a balance sheet, enabled the curious to draw not very accurate conclusions.  It is not easy for the plain man to read a balance sheet or estimate profits, especially when shares are being subdivided, or when bonus shares are being issued, or large sums carried to reserve.  The result has been continual and natural suspicion on the part of the miners, who doubtless imagined the colliery-owners’ profits to be much larger than they were.  The miners knew that whenever they asked for an increase in their wages they were liable to be told that such an increase would turn a moderate profit into a substantial loss, but the amount of the profit they had to take on trust.  Selling prices, yes, but profits, no.

The war and coal control partly killed that, and it must not return.  By the settlement of June, 1921, for the first time the miners have established the principle of the adjustment of their wages in accordance with the proceeds of the industry “as ascertained by returns to be made by the owners, checked by a joint test audit of the owners’ books carried out by independent accountants appointed by each side.”  That is an important step, but does not go anything like far enough.

At least two good results would accrue if colliery-owners conducted their business more in public:  (i) a great deal of the suspicion and mistrust of the miners would be removed, and they would realise why and when their wages must undergo fluctuations, and the value of the many other factors besides wages which went to make up the pit-head cost of coal; (ii) publicity coupled with costing returns would make it possible to draw comparative conclusions as to the cost of production in different mines and districts, which would be a fruitful source of experiment and improvement.  Publicity does not involve publication of lists of customers, British or foreign.

THE LESSEES OF THE FUTURE

How far will the lessees to whom the National Mining Board will grant leases to work the coal be the same persons and companies as the present lessees?  In this matter it is desirable to maintain the maximum amount of flexibility and variety.  I do not think we have yet discovered the ideal unit, the ideal organisation for the development of our principal national asset.  So much do our coalfields differ in geological formation, in tradition, in the subdivision and classification of labour, in outlet for trade, that it is unlikely that any single unit or organisation will be the ideal one for every coalfield.  So we must resist any attempt, especially an early attempt, at stereotyping or standardising the type of lessee.  By trial and error we shall learn much.