from without, and the honour and interest of Great Britain, which are staked on the preservation of the Ottoman empire from foreign aggressions.  Although he may indulge in such day dreams, it is impossible but that a man of Prince Michael’s calibre must be alive to all the opposing elements which will defer the accomplishment of them to a remote period.  Notwithstanding natural prejudices, which in his case, however, are not very strong, it is probable that he now sees the inutility, and understands how visionary are the ambitious projects which he once entertained touching Servia.  Such, at least, is the opinion of those who have the best opportunities of forming a correct judgement in the matter.  Whatever may be his own intellect, whatever his ability to conceive and execute, Servia is too degraded to carry him through.  To be the nucleus of a large kingdom, certain elements are necessary, in which she is strikingly deficient.  Among these may be placed tried and flourishing institutions, unity of sentiment and purpose amidst all classes, and a due appreciation of the advantages of education and commerce; while last, but perhaps the most important of all, is civil and religious liberty of the highest order.  In all of these, I repeat, Servia is eminently wanting.

A very slight glimpse also at her financial and military resources will show how far she is fitted to take even a leading part in any emeute which circumstances may hereafter bring about.  The total revenue of the country has up to this time amounted to 200,000_l._ sterling.  This has been raised by a tax of $5 levied on about 40,000 males.  Nearly the whole sum is expended in paying and equipping the army, and in the salary of officials.  Dissatisfied with the small amount of revenue, the Prince undertook, during the past year, to reorganise the taxation.  An impost upon property was projected in lieu of the capitation tax, but having, unfortunately, started without any very well-defined basis, the system broke down, actually producing a smaller revenue than was yielded by the original method.  Equally abortive, as might have been anticipated, was the scheme for raising a militia of 50,000 men.  Presupposing, for the sake of argument, a strong military spirit to be rife among the people, the financial condition of the country would render the idea untenable, since it is with difficulty that the 1,800 soldiers who constitute the regular army can be maintained.  Granting even the willingness to serve, and the ability of the government to pay them, the population of the country would not, according to ordinary statistics, furnish so large a force.  The greatest number that could be calculated on in the event of war would be about 40,000 men, and these only in a war in which the national sympathy might be deeply enlisted.  How many of this number would remain in arms, would probably depend on the amount of plunder to be obtained, and the nature of the resistance which they might encounter.