The eastern policy of France, during the Italian war, was subjected to many powerful conflicting influences.  The chances of creating a diversion in the rear of Austria, owing to the unsettled state of the Turkish provinces, was probably thought of.  Why the idea was abandoned is not for us here to enquire; but it may be in part attributed to the display of force which Turkey for once put forth at the right moment.  Be this as it may, no disturbance took place until the winter of 1859, when, upon the withdrawal of the Turkish troops, fresh rumours of an insurrectionary nature were heard.  These are well known to have been encouraged and circulated by the Servian Government, which calculated upon foreign support, at any rate that of Russia.  But Russia has no wish to precipitate a crisis.  The disastrous results of Prince Gortschakoff’s mission have, at any rate, taught her the impolicy of plucking at the fruit before it is ripe.  Her own internal reorganisation, moreover, occupies her sufficiently, and renders any active interference for the moment impracticable.  Even were it otherwise, were Russia able and willing to renew the struggle in behalf of her co-religionists, the report of Prince Dolgorouki as to the amount of assistance likely to be derived from them, would hardly tend to encourage her in her disinterested undertaking.  This envoy arrived at Belgrade in the latter part of 1859, while Prince Gortschakoff’s charges were issued shortly after his return, and were doubtless based upon his reports. (Yet it is more than probable that the primary object of his mission was to enquire into and to regulate the revolutionary movements, which at that moment had acquired a certain degree of importance.) The Bulgarian emissaries told him frankly that no rising could be looked for in those provinces, unless Russia took the initiative.  They reminded him that in 1842, when Baron Lieven visited Belgrade, the Bulgarians were induced by the promises of Prince Michael Obrenovitch to rise en masse.  These promises were never fulfilled, and the insurrection was put down with great barbarities by the neighbouring Albanian levies.  This single fact is tolerably conclusive as to the unreality of a south Slavonic insurrection, of which so much has been said, and to promote which so much trouble has been taken.  Even were the discontent tenfold as deep-rooted as it now is, the Turkish Government might rely on the Mussulman population and the Arnauts to suppress any rising of the Christians.  The chief danger to Turkey lies in the truculent nature of those whom she would be compelled to let loose upon the insurgents, and who would commit excesses which might be made an excuse for foreign intervention.  The attainment of this ignoble end has been and still is the policy pursued by more than one power.  Prince Milosch played admirably into their hands, not foreseeing that in the general bouleversement which would be the result, the independence of Servia might be disregarded.