’Any one who is ready to give freely, as the etymology implies, on whatever scale, is “liberal.”  “Bountiful,” again, is stronger than “liberal,” and implies giving in abundance; it also differs from “liberal” in being restricted to giving; while “liberal” is applied to an easy style of expenditure in general; to the reverse, in short, of “stingy,” or “miserly.”  Many people live in a liberal style, who are very far from being “bountiful.”  Bountiful always seems to imply, giving out of an ample store.

’"Philanthropic,” as its etymology indicates, implies benevolence solely in reference to the human race, and always to masses, not to individuals.  One who devises some plan to benefit numbers, is called “philanthropic;” but we should not talk of “philanthropically giving a loaf to a hungry child."’—­(P. 83-85.)

As space is beginning to press, our last extract must be short:  it relates to words often enough employed indiscriminately—­imagination, conception, fancy. ’"Imagination” and “fancy” are frequently confounded together, but are, nevertheless, very distinct in their signification.  In the first place, “imagination” implies more of a creative power than “fancy;” it requires a greater combination of various powers, and is therefore a higher exercise of genius.  “Fancy,” on the other hand, is more an employment of ingenuity and taste, though it also requires inventive power.  Secondly, “imagination” implies a longer flight; “fancy,” rather a succession of short efforts:  the one is a steady blaze; the other, a series of sparkles.  An epic poem would require an exercise of the first; a ballad, or other lighter production, of the last:  hence, we may see that the difference between the two is, in some measure, one of subject-matter; for the same power which we call “fancy” when employed in a melody of Moore, would be called “imagination” in the works of Dante or Milton.  In short, the efforts of “fancy” bear the same relation to those of “imagination” that the carving and polishing of a gem or seal does to sculpture.

’In the third place, wit may come into works of “fancy,” and could not be admitted into the province of “imagination.”  The same with what are called conceits.

’"Conception” has something in common with imagination, but it implies more decidedly a creative power, and is referred to something tangible and real; whereas, in efforts of fancy and imagination, there is always a consciousness of unreality.  The province of “conception” is that which has a real existence:  hence, the productions of painters, sculptors, and musicians, are called “conceptions.”  “Conception” also denotes something framed and originated in our own mind; whereas the imagination or fancy may be acted on merely from without.  The poet or writer of fiction exercises his own conceptions, but awakens the imagination of his readers.’

These quotations will give as general a notion of the work as can be conveyed by a few extracts.  To those among our readers who may be in quest of such a book, we can decidedly recommend it as one that is certain to be useful.  It is by far the best of the kind that we have ever happened to meet with; and we think that if it were universally studied and consulted, the result would be a great improvement of expression, both in common speech and literature.