each distinct use.  The more power we have of discriminating the nicer shades of meaning, the greater facility we possess of giving force and precision to our expressions.  Our own language possesses great advantages in this respect; for being partly derived from the Teutonic, and partly from the Latin, we have a large number of duplicates from the two sources, which are, for the most part, though not universally, slightly varied in their meaning.

‘These slight variations of meaning,’ he proceeds, add to the copiousness of the English language, by affording words of more or less familiarity, and of greater and less force.  This may easily be understood, if we consider that the branch of the Teutonic, spoken in England during the Anglo-Saxon period, never became extinct, but that three-fourths of the English language at present consist of words altered or derived from that ancient dialect; that these words usually express the most familiar ideas—­such as man, house, land, &c.; and that the French terms gradually introduced, being those of a more highly civilised people, were adapted to express the more refined ideas.  This is true even of physical objects; thus, for instance, most of the names of the animals used for food are still Teutonic—­such as ox, sheep, swine, &c.  The Anglo-Saxons, like the modern Germans, had no objection to say ox-flesh, sheep-flesh, swine’s-flesh; but the Norman conquerors, introducing a more refined cookery, introduced with it French words for the flesh of the animal; hence we have beef, mutton, pork, &c.’

It has not been the author’s design to notice all the synonyms in the language—­that, as he remarks, would be an almost endless undertaking; ’but merely, after excluding technical terms, and words which do exactly coincide, to select a few of those groups of words which are in most frequent use, and are most liable to be confounded.’  His purpose, perhaps, will be more distinctly shewn, if we add a few more sentences from the preface.

‘Many persons,’ says he, ’imagine that two words must either coincide precisely in their meaning, so as to be, in the primary and strict sense of the word, “synonymous,” or else stand for two (more or less) distinct things.  Indeed, it would often be regarded as almost a truism to assert this; but those who maintain such an opinion overlook the fact, that two words, without exactly coinciding in sense, may nevertheless relate to one and the same thing, regarded in two different points of view.  An illustration of this is afforded in the relation which exists between the words, “inference” and “proof.”  Whoever justly infers, proves; and whoever proves, infers; but the word “inference” leads the mind from the premises which have been assumed, to the conclusion which follows from them; while the word “proof” follows a reverse process, and leads the mind from the conclusion to the premises.  We say:  “What do you infer from this?” and “How do you prove that?"[5] Another illustration may be quoted in the synonyms, “expense” and “cost.”  The same article may be expensive and costly; but we speak of expense in reference to the means of the purchaser; of cost, in reference to the actual value of the article.’