The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 18, No. 110, December, 1866 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 302 pages of information about The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 18, No. 110, December, 1866.

The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 18, No. 110, December, 1866 eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 302 pages of information about The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 18, No. 110, December, 1866.

This is the reason why Austria cannot very hopefully look for a revival of her power, as it so often revived after defeat in old days, and under an entirely different state of things from that which now exists.  A power has come into existence such as she has never been accustomed to deal with, and of which her statesmen have no knowledge.  An Austrian statesman is scarcely more advanced than a Frenchman of the time of Louis Quatorze; and we verily believe that Louvois or Torcy would be quite as much at home in European politics at this moment as Mensdorff or Belcredi.  Had they been well informed as to the condition of the times, they never would have so acted as to bring about the late war.  It was their reliance on the ability of mere governments to settle every question in dispute, that caused them to plunge into a conflict with Prussia and Italy, when their master’s empire was bankrupt, and when more or less of discontent existed in almost every part of that empire.  Statesmen who knew the age, and who were aware of the change that has come over Europe in half a century, would have told the Emperor that to rely on “something turning up,” after the ancient Austrian custom, would not answer in 1866, and that peoples as well as princes had much to do with the ordering of every nation’s policy; and with every people Austria is unpopular.  It is not difficult now to understand that Francis Joseph had a profound reliance on Napoleon III., that he believed the Frenchman would prevent his being driven to the wall, and that Prussia would be the greatest sufferer by the war, as she would be forced to part with the Rhine provinces.  His mistake with respect to France was not a great one, as the French saw the triumph of Prussia with much bitterness of feeling, and gladly would have joined the Austrians; but the mistake he made in regard to Germany was very great, and shows that he and his advisers knew nothing of Germanic feeling.  If they could thus err on a point that was plain to every intelligent foreigner, how can we expect them to exhibit more intelligence and more sense with respect to the new state of things proceeding from the event of the war?  If they could not comprehend matters of fact at the beginning of last June, why should we conclude that they will be Solomons hereafter?  Brought face to face with a new state of things, they so proceeded as to convince all impartial observers that they were wellnigh as ignorant of what had been going on among men, as the Seven Sleepers were when roused from their long slumber.  But for this, unless we assume that they were fools, not only would they not have admitted war to be possible, but they never would have allowed the coming about of such a state of things as led to the dispute with Prussia.  The entire action of the Austrian government with reference to the affairs of Germany, for several years, was admirably calculated to lead to what has taken place this year.  That government, had it been wise, never would have acted with Prussia in the

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The Atlantic Monthly, Volume 18, No. 110, December, 1866 from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.