in his most wonderful history, and won the victory of Wagram, and allowed the Austrian monarchy to exist only because he thought of marrying a daughter of its head,—­when Hungarians, Italians, Germans, and others of its subjects were in arms against it, in 1848-49,—­when Montebello and Palestro were followed by Magenta and Solferino,—­the condition of the house of Austria was nearly as low as it is to-day, and on some of these occasions probably it was even more reduced than it is at present.  Men were ready in 1529, in 1552, in 1619, in 1632, in 1683, in 1704, in 1741, in 1805, in 1809, in 1849, and in 1859 to say, as now they say, that the last hour of the fortunate dynasty was about to strike on the clock of Time, forgetting all its earlier escapes from the last consequences of defeat, recollection of which would have enabled them to form better judgments.  On a dozen occasions Austria has risen superior to the effects of the direst misfortunes, and she may do so again.  And her triumphs, proceeding out of failures, have not been won over common men or in ordinary contests.  She has rarely had to deal with mean antagonists, and her singular victories have been enhanced in value by the high grade of her enemies.  Francis I., Sultan Solyman, Gustavus Adolphus, Wallenstein, Richelieu, Louis XIV., Napoleon I., and Kossuth are conspicuous in the list of her enemies.  They were all great men,—­deriving greatness some of them from their intellectual powers, others from their positions as sovereigns, and yet others from both their positions and their powers of mind.  Yet she got the better of them all,[31] and some of them fell miserably because of her enmity to them,—­as Wallenstein and Napoleon.  Frederick the Great was in some sense an exception, as he accomplished most of his purposes at her expense; and yet it cannot with propriety be said that he conquered her, or that, at the utmost, he was ever more than the equal of Maria Theresa or Joseph II., with all his undoubted intellectual superiority.  When we compare the Austria of 1813 with the Austria of 1809, and see how wonderfully fortune had worked in her favor under circumstances far from promising anything for her benefit, we are not surprised that Austrians should still be full of confidence, or that a few other men should share what seems to be in them a well-founded hope.  A belief in good luck sometimes helps men to the enjoyment of good luck,—­and if men, why not nations?

Yet against this reliance on her luck by Austria must be placed the wonderful changes that have come over the world since those times when it was in the power of a government like the Austrian to exert a great influence on the course of events.  Down to the time of the French Revolution, Austrian contests were carried on against nations, governments, and dynasties, and not against peoples.  Even the wars that grew out of the Reformation were in no strict sense of a popular character, but were waged by the great of