Now let us consider for a moment some of the positive criticisms on the Christian heaven, and then apply them to the proposed substitute.  The belief in heaven, say the positivists, is to be set aside for two great reasons.  In the first place there is no objective proof of its existence, and in the second place there is subjective proof of its impossibility.  Not only is it not deducible, but it is not even thinkable.  Give the imagination carte blanche to construct it, and the imagination will either do nothing, or will do something ridiculous. ‘My position [with regard to this matter]’ says a popular living writer,[27] ’is this—­The idea of a glorified energy in an ampler life, is an idea utterly incompatible with exact thought, one which evaporates in contradictions, in phrases, which when pressed have no meaning.’

Now if this criticism has the least force, as used against the Christian heaven, it has certainly far more as used against the future glories of humanity.  The positivists ask the Christians how they expect to enjoy themselves in heaven.  The Christians may, with far more force, ask the positivists how they expect to enjoy themselves on earth.  For the Christians’ heaven being ex hypothesi an unknown world, they do not stultify their expectations from being unable to describe them.  On the contrary it is a part of their faith that they are indescribable.  But the positivists’ heaven is altogether in this world; and no mystical faith has any place in their system.  In this case, therefore, whatever we may think of the other, it is plain that the tests in question are altogether complete and final.  To the Christians, indeed, it is quite open to make their supposed shame their glory, and to say that their heaven would be nothing if describable.  The positivists have bound themselves to admit that theirs is nothing unless describable.

What then, let us ask the enthusiasts of humanity, will humanity be like in its ideally perfect state?  Let them show us some sample of the general future perfection; let them describe one of the nobler, ampler, glorified human beings of the future.  What will he be like?  What will he long for?  What will he take pleasure in?  How will he spend his days?  How will he make love?  What will he laugh at?  And let him be described in phrases which when pressed do not evaporate in contradictions, but which have some distinct meaning, and are not incompatible with exact thought.  Do our exact thinkers in the least know what they are prophesying?  If not, what is the meaning of their prophecy?  The prophecies of the positive school are rigid scientific inferences; they are that or nothing.  And one cannot infer an event of whose nature one is wholly ignorant.

Let these obvious questions be put to our positive moralists—­these questions they have themselves suggested, and the grotesque unreality of this vague optimism will be at once apparent.  Never was vagary of mediaeval faith so groundless as this.  The Earthly Paradise that the mediaeval world believed in was not more mythical than the Earthly Paradise believed in by our exact thinkers now; and George Eliot might just as well start in a Cunard steamer to find the one, as send her faith into the future to find the other.