axiom, that verification is the test of truth; or that we can build on nothing as certain but what we can prove true.  The meaning of the word ‘proof’ by itself may perhaps be somewhat hazy; but the meaning that positive science attaches to it is plain enough.  A fact is only proved when the evidence it rests upon leaves us no room for doubt—­when it forces on every mind the same invincible conviction; that is, in other words, when, directly or indirectly, its material equivalent can be impressed upon our bodily senses.

This is the fulcrum of the modern intellectual lever.  Ask anyone oppressed and embittered by the want of religion the reason why he does not again embrace it, and the answer will still be this—­that there is no proof that it is true.  Granting, says Professor Huxley, that a religious creed would be beneficial, ’my next step is to ask for a proof of its dogmas.’  And with contemptuous passion another well-known writer, Mr. Leslie Stephen, has classified all beliefs, according as we can prove or not prove them, into realities and empty dreams. ’The ignorant and childish,’ he says, ’are hopelessly unable to draw the line between dreamland and reality; but the imagery which takes its rise in the imagination as distinguished from the perceptions, bears indelible traces of its origin in comparative unsubstantiality and vagueness of outline.’  And ‘now,’ he exclaims, turning to the generation around him, ’at last your creed is decaying.  People have discovered that you know nothing about it; that heaven and hell belong to dreamland; that the impertinent young curate who tells me that I shall be burnt everlastingly for not sharing his superstition, is just as ignorant as I myself, and that I know as much as my dog.’[34]

Such is that syllogism of the physical sciences which is now supposed to be so invincible against all religion, and which has already gone so far towards destroying the world’s faith in it.  Now as to the minor premiss, that there is no proof of religion, we may concede, at least provisionally, that it is completely true.  What it is really important to examine is the major premiss, that we can be certain of nothing that we cannot support by proof.  This it is plain does not stand on the same footing as the former, for it is of its very nature not capable of being proved itself.  Its foundation is something far less definable—­the general character for wisdom of the leading thinkers who have adopted it, and the general acceptance of its consequences by the common sense of mankind.

Now if we examine its value by these tests, the result will be somewhat startling.  We find that not only are mankind at large as yet but very partially aware of its consequences, but that its true scope and meaning has not even dawned dimly on the leading thinkers themselves.  Few spectacles, indeed, in the whole history of thought are more ludicrous than that of the modern positive school with their