a great fleet, to which any considerable disaster may prove fatal to our domestic security; and which, in order to effectuate its purpose, must probably engage a fleet of superior force.  Sore eyes have made me delay writing to you so long.—­I ever am, my dear sir, your most faithful and affectionate humble servant,

     ADAM SMITH.

     CUSTOM HOUSE, EDINBURGH,

     14th October 1782.[324]

The strong opinion expressed in this letter of the uselessness of colonial dependencies, which contributed nothing to the maintenance of the mother country, had of course been already expressed in the Wealth of Nations.  “Perish uncontributing colonies” is the very pith of the last sentence of that work.  “If any of the provinces of the British Empire cannot be made to contribute towards the support of the whole empire, it is surely time that Great Britain should free herself from the expense of defending those provinces in time of war and of supporting any part of their civil or military establishments in time of peace; and endeavour to accommodate her future views and designs to the real mediocrity of her circumstances.”

The principles of free trade presently got an impetus from the conclusion of peace with America and France in 1783.  Lord Shelburne wrote Abbe Morellet in 1783 that the treaties of that year were inspired from beginning to end by “the great principle of free trade,” and that “a peace was good in the exact proportion that it recognised that principle.”  A fitting opportunity was thought to have arisen for making somewhat extended applications of the principle, and many questions were asked about how far such applications should go in this direction or that.  When the American Intercourse Bill was before the House in 1783, one of Lord Shelburne’s colleagues in the Ministry, William Eden, approached Smith in considerable perplexity as to the wisdom of conceding to the new republic free commercial intercourse with this country and our colonies.  Eden had already done something for free trade in Ireland, and he was presently to earn a name as a great champion of that principle, after successfully negotiating with Dupont de Nemours the Commercial Treaty with France in 1786; but in 1787 he had not accepted the principle so completely as his chief, Lord Shelburne.  Perhaps, indeed, he never took a firm hold of the principle at any time, for Smith always said of him, “He is but a man of detail."[325] Anyhow, when he wrote Smith in 1783 he was under serious alarm at the proposal to give the United States the same freedom to trade with Canada and Nova Scotia as we enjoyed ourselves.  Being so near those colonies, the States would be sure to oust Great Britain and Ireland entirely out of the trade of provisioning them.  The Irish fisheries would be ruined, the English carrying trade would be lost.  The Americans, with fur at their doors, could easily beat us in hats, and if we allowed them