FINANCIAL INTERESTS

It has already been remarked that the conditions which limit and control the size of armaments are partly geographical and partly financial, and that while the former represent the minimum, the latter stand for the maximum of protective force.  I need say nothing further about the geographical conditions.  Every one who studies a map can see for himself what is required by a country anxious to protect its shores or its boundaries.  If we suppose that armaments are strictly limited to the needs of self-defence, and if we further assume that in the new Europe countries are not animated by the strongest dislikes against one another, but are prepared to live and let live (a tolerably large assumption, I am aware), we can readily imagine a steady process of curtailment in the absolutely necessary armament.  Further, if Great Britain gave up its doctrine of the Right of Capture at Sea (and if Great Britain surrendered it, we may be pretty sure that, after Germany has been made powerless, no other country would wish to retain it), the supposed necessity of protecting lines of commerce would disappear and a further reduction in cruisers would take place.  I cannot imagine that either America or Japan would wish to revive the Right of Capture theory if we ourselves had given it up.  And they are the most important maritime and commercial nations after ourselves.[15]

The financial conditions, however, deserve study because they lead straight to the very heart of the modern bellicose tendencies.  In an obvious and superficial sense, financial conditions represent the maximum in the provision of armaments, because ultimately it becomes a question of how much a nation can afford to spend without going bankrupt or being fatally hampered in its expenditure on necessary social reforms.  This, however, is not perhaps the most significant point.  Financial conditions act much more subtly than this.  Why has it grown so imperative on states to have large armies or large navies, or both?  Because—­so we have been told over and over again—­diplomacy cannot speak with effect unless it is backed by power.  And what are the main occasions on which diplomacy has to speak effectively?  We should be inclined to answer off-hand that it must possess this stentorian power when there is any question about national honour—­when the country for whom it speaks is insulted or bullied, or defrauded of its just rights; when treaties are torn up and disregarded; when its plighted word has been given and another nation acts as though no such pledge had been made; when its territory is menaced with invasion and so forth.

[15] As a matter of fact, the United States are opposed to the Capture at Sea principle.

PROTECTION OF FINANCIERS