[11] See Our Russian Ally, by Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace (Macmillan).

MILITARY AUTOCRACY

The end of a great war, however, has one inevitable result, that it leaves a military autocracy in supreme control of affairs.  The armies which have won the various campaigns, the generals who have led them, the Commanders-in-Chief who have carried out the successful strategy, these are naturally left with almost complete authority in their hands.  Wellington, for instance, a hundred years ago, held an extraordinarily strong position in deciding the fate of Europe.  And so, too, did the Russian Tsar, whose armies had done so much to destroy the legend of Napoleonic invincibility.  Similar conditions must be expected on the present occasion.  And, perhaps, the real use of diplomats, if they are prudent and level-headed men, is to control the ambitions of the military element, to adopt a wider outlook, to consider the ultimate consequences rather than the immediate effects of things.  It would indeed be a lamentable result if a war which was intended to destroy militarism in Europe should end by setting up militarism in high places.

LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

Thus we seem to see still more clearly than before that the size of armaments in Europe constitutes a fundamental problem with which we have to grapple.  Every soldier, as a matter of course, believes in military armaments, and is inclined to exaggerate their social and not merely their offensive value.  Those of us who are not soldiers, but who are interested in the social and economic development of the nation, know, on the contrary, that the most destructive and wasteful form of expenditure is that which is occupied with armaments grown so bloated that they go far to render the most pressing domestic reforms absolutely impossible.  How, then, can we limit the size of armaments?  What provision can we make to keep in check that desire to fortify itself, to entrench itself in an absolutely commanding position, which inherently belongs to the military mind?  In the case of both navies and armies something depends on geographical conditions, and something on financial possibilities.  The first represents, as it were, the minimum required for safety; the second the maximum burden which a state can endure without going into bankruptcy.[12] Our own country, we should say, requires fleets, so far as geographical conditions are concerned, for the protection of her shores, and, inasmuch as she is a scattered empire, we must have our warships in all the Seven Seas.  France, in her turn, requires a navy which shall protect her in the Mediterranean, and especially render access easy to her North African possessions.  On the supposition that she is good friends with England, she does not require ships in the North Sea or in the English Channel, while, vice versa, England, so long as France is strong in the Mediterranean, need only keep quite small detachments at Gibraltar, Malta, and elsewhere.  Russia must have a fleet for the Baltic, and also a fleet in the Black Sea.  Beyond that her requirements assuredly do not go.  Italy’s activities are mainly in the Mediterranean.  Under the supposition that she is conquered, Germany stands in some danger of losing her navy altogether.